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1-100 of about 215 matches for site:plato.stanford.edu site:plato.stanford.edu actual property
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/intellectual-property/
8, 2011; substantive revision Thu Aug 18, 2022 Intellectual property is generally characterized as non-physical property that is the
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/intellectual-property/
8, 2011; substantive revision Thu Aug 18, 2022 Intellectual property is generally characterized as non-physical property that is the
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/intrinsic-extrinsic/
relation to a time, but this means that it is not an intrinsic property. So any property that
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/qm-modal/
actual value \(\alpha\) at \(t_0\) to the property \(P'\) having the actual value \(\beta\) at \(t_1
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/possible-worlds/
phrase ‘the actual world’ does not indicate any special property of the actual world that distinguishes it
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/physicalism/
that it is not sufficient, consider the variety of dualism usually called property dualism . Property dualism says
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/qm-manyworlds/
a particular approach to the MWI (which differs from the popular “actual splitting worlds” approach in
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ruth-barcan-marcus/
beta_2\) is identical to \(\beta_1\) just in case for any property of \(\beta_1
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/possible-objects/
object is an actual object, that is, it is either an actual existing object or an actual non-existing object; (3
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/locke-political/#SepaPoweDissGove
contract and actual contract theories will tend to answer this question differently. 3. Property Locke’s treatment of
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/locke-political/#SepaPoweDissGove
contract and actual contract theories will tend to answer this question differently. 3. Property Locke’s treatment of
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/existence/
says of that property that it is not uniquely instantiated. As the property—the true
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/moral-cognitivism/embedding-problem...
truth according to which truth is some sort of “substantial” relation or property. For example
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/fitness/
Trait Fitness Some philosophers (notably Sober, 2013) have argued that evolutionary fitness is a property of populations
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/possibilism-actualism/
of contingent non-actuality, or mere possibility , is empty: necessarily, anything that could have been actual already is actual. Otherwise
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/broad/
our minds something that is elliptical. Obviously “we can quite well mistakenly believe a property to be
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/liberalism/
a rejection of the presumption that citizens are the king’s property; on the contrary
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/moral-non-naturalism/
Principia to explain in what sense goodness was a non-natural property were untenable (Moore 1942
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/modality-varieties/
it lies in your nature to be born of your actual parents; that (3) is
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/truth-deflationary/
of view, there is a truth property: It is simply the property that all true propositions
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/aristotle-natphil/
to this potentiality, nor to the lack of a property, nor, without further qualifications
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/platonism/
a platonistic view of properties . Consider, for instance, the property of being
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/quantum-bayesian/
such an experiment. But there are strong reasons not to equate probability with any actual relative frequency (see entry
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/identity-indiscernible/
hereafter called the Principle) is usually formulated as follows: if, for every property F , object x has
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/kochen-specker/
Bibliography Academic Tools Other Internet Resources Related Entries 1. Introduction QM has the peculiar property that quantum-mechanical states
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/intentionality/
a first-level intentio , applies to individual dogs or to the property of being
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/nominalism-metaphysics/
to answer is: What makes F -things F (where “ F ” is a sparse property predicate)? For instance
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/logical-truth/
instances too. A form has at the very least the property that the expressions
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/identity-time/
s later properties is having earlier had a handle. That is the property the truncated
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/immutability/
doctrine of divine immutability (DDI) asserts that God cannot change in accidental property. To understand
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/publicity/
to the assessment of the maxim’s (in)justice. 2. Actual Publicity Actual publicity can
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/contractarianism-contemporary/
individuals subject to collectively enforced social arrangements shows that those arrangements have some normative property (they are legitimate, just
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/causal-models/
logic of counterfactuals, decision theory, and the analysis of actual causation. 1. Introduction 2
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/contractarianism-contemporary/
individuals subject to collectively enforced social arrangements shows that those arrangements have some normative property (they are legitimate, just
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/wittgenstein-aesthetics/
very shortly find ourselves asking what is the essence of the property beauty that this particular
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/moral-cognitivism/
as our actual normative language does. It is therefore reasonable to conclude that our actual normative language is of
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/functionalism/
of them. This argument has come to be known as the “Distinct Property Argument”, and was
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/causation-probabilistic/
3 surveys developments in causal modeling. Section 4 covers probabilistic accounts of actual causation. 1. Motivation and
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/disability/
bodily difference and functional limitation more than to reflect the actual views of individuals
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/multiple-realizability/
of mind, the multiple realizability thesis contends that a single mental kind (property, state, event) can be
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/qualia/
hypothesis that such zombies are nomically possible, that their existence is consistent with the actual laws of nature
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/nonexistent-objects/
has the property of having exactly one property. (2) The property of being
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/fictionalism-modal/
committed to the existence of possible worlds, merely hypothetical situations, non-actual but possible objects etc
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/original-position/
integrity of the person with the right to hold personal property; equal political liberties, and
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/identity-relative/
of the structure). It might be an equivalence relation \(E\) having the property that for some
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/private-language/
function of the private language argument is to show that not only actual languages but the
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/causation-metaphysics/
be called a claim about token causation . (This is sometimes called singular causation , or actual causation .) A causal
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/logic-temporal/
Ockham, for example, embraced the idea of a true or actual future, holding that future
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/continuity/
atoms, parts which cannot themselves be further divided. Aristotle sometimes recognizes infinite divisibility —the property of being
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/legitimacy/
of legitimacy is that it is of only limited use in understanding actual processes of legitimation
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/inner-speech/
of actual speech. A couple of philosophers who hold the actual speech view but express
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/qm-consistent-histories/
using a phase space \(\Gamma\) with points denoted by \(\gamma\). A classical property \(P\) is a
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/henry-ghent/
an absolute sense, every essence possesses a double indifference: with regard to actual existence or non-existence
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/sense-data/
the “transparency” of the mind: if our impressions have a property, that property must appear
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/aesthetics-18th-german/
of actually existing objects can be regarded as perfections, since they held that the actual world is the
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/game-theory/
think about this sort of problem systematically, it had occurred to some actual military leaders and
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/logic-intensional/
is Clark Kent” is even more difficult to deal with, since there is no actual person the names
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/tropes/
Because tropes are particular, for two objects to ‘share’ a property (for them
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/consciousness-higher/
here is between phenomenal consciousness , on the one hand—which is a property of states
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/naturalism/
So, if some special cause is not ontologically separate from some physical cause, the property instantiations that it involves
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/price/
dimensional: “It is a plain phenomenological fact that visual fields have the property of depth
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/lambda-calculus/
understood as a set \(f\) of ordered pairs satisfying the property that \((x,y) \in
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/peter-spain/
de Rijk 1962–67, Vol. II, Part I, pp. 113–117). The primary semantic property of a
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/set-theory/
every analytic set has the perfect set property. But the perfect set property for co
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/original-position/
integrity of the person with the right to hold personal property; equal political liberties, and
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/dependence-ontological/
in Fine 1994a). What could be a plausible example of an essential property of an
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/mendelssohn/
the less plausible assumption that “that everything actual must be thought to be actual by some thinking being
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/rule-of-law/
like a presumption of liberty and respect for private property rights. But these are
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/qm-manyworlds/
a particular approach to the MWI (which differs from the popular “actual splitting worlds” approach in
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/rigid-designators/
H) could have been false: (H) would have been false had some other such world been actual. 1.2 Standard Clarifications
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/moral-anti-realism/
Ayer’s translation schema; thus the issues of whether the property of wrongness
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/descriptions/
I know, published, would be to suppose that there is a rigid property of being
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/metaethics/
a matter of thinking that actions, institutions, or characters had some particular natural property or other. According to
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/mind-identity/
beliefs and desires, but others, sometimes called ‘central state materialists’, say that mental states are actual brain states. Identity theorists
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/proof-theory-development/
a justification. Say, if the assumption that all natural numbers have the property P leads to
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/spinoza-epistemology-mind/
and explanatorily prior to the claim that this thinking substance also produces an actual representation or idea of
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/logic-epistemic/
in the yard, but no dog. Then \(w_{2}\) would represent the actual world of the
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/reduction-biology/
a) biological properties supervene on physical properties (i.e., no difference in a biological property without a difference
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/hobbes-science/
motion and sometimes at rest. Furthermore, he held that the only essential property of body
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/aesthetic-judgment/
would preserve the spirit of the subjectivist doctrine while fitting our actual lives more accurately. The
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/hilbert-program/
understood the numerals is difficult to answer. They are not physical objects (actual strokes on paper, for
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/aesthetic-experience/
Summa Theologica ) conceived of beauty as a real and objective property inhering in objects
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/platonism-mathematics/
mathematical practice that it should avoid ascribing to mathematics any features that would render actual mathematical practice misguided or
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/natural-language-ontology/
not be able to be “really” be true (unless it predicates a property of the
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/naturalism/
So, if some special cause is not ontologically separate from some physical cause, the property instantiations that it involves
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/settheory-early/
should be noted at the outset: It is not the case that actual infinity was universally rejected
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/mental-representation/
experience (perceptual representation) of a clear sky at noon is a property of the
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/epistemology-india/
of sandalwood which is seen at too far a distance for actual olfactory stimulation. These are
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/liberty-positive-negative/
often invoked in defences of the right to private property. This said, some philosophers
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/aristotle-mathematics/
use of abstract quantities marked by letters in proofs instead of actual numerical values, and
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/liberty-positive-negative/
often invoked in defences of the right to private property. This said, some philosophers
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/methodological-individualism/
theory of ideal types. Historical explanation may make reference to the actual content of the
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/contractarianism/
initial situation in the theory: is it to be considered an actual historical situation, a
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/qt-idind/
that individual objects are impenetrable . A more thorough-going criticism of this property based approach to
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/spacetime-bebecome/
or substance, \(S\), can change in terms of a quality or property if property \(P_1\) and
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/infinity/
without limit. This conception stands in opposition to that of ‘actual infinity’, which would result
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/husserl/
images may exist without there being a depicted object in the actual world. For Husserl
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/philosophy-mathematics/
in another way. Frege’s Basic Law V entails that corresponding to every property of mathematical
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/qt-entangle/
a probe for the presence or absence of a property, represented by a
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/rousseau/
agriculture and metallurgy and the first establishment of private property, together with the